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T. TI\TRODUCTION
The Chinese economy has become increasingly open since the late 1970s when the country embarked on economic reforms. How this increased openness has affected other developing countries has been a subject of intense debate, especially since the Asian crisis of 1997-98. Although most analysts attribute the crisis to corporate-sector weaknesses and macroeconomic vulnerability in the crisis economies, some have ar~ued that China's mcreasmg competitIOn was at least partly responsIble for the cns!s.-Chma's acceSSIOn to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December II, 2001 has intensitied the debate. It has been contended that China has become a price seUer for labor-intensive manufactured goods in the world market and that competitive pressure it creates could trigger a global detlation 3 China's sheer size in terms of population and. by implication (or extrapolation), its potential economic might, give rise to fear that China might wipe other developing countries out of the world market for labor-intensive manufactJnes. China's seemingly insatiable appetite for foreign direct investment (FDI) leaves little capital for other developing countries. If this were combined with a devaluation ofthe renminbi in the aftermath of WTO accession, so the argument goes, China could exert significant downward pressure on the growth of its competitors. 4 Others recognize that China will become an increasingly important exp0l1 market as it opens up further after WTO accession. They argue that in the long run China's growth and opcning up arc likely to benefit other developing countries (Huang, 200 I; Adhikari and Yang. 2002) . This paper intends to accomplish two tasks. First. it analyzes the effects of China's WTO accession on othcr dcveloping countrics. Specifically, it trics to identify areas in which developing countries might be adversely atfected by China's WTO accession and where and how they might benefit from it. It also providcs some overall assessments. Sccond, thc papcr places China's WTO accession in the context of its long-term process of economic growth and opening up, and examincs how this proccss is diffcrcnt from WTO accession alonc in 4 See Supachai and Clifford (2002) for a detailed account of the concerns. The concerns over a possible devaluation of the renminbi following WTO accession turned out to be unfounded. One would expect that China's tradc liberalization would result in downward pressure on the value of the renminbi in the short run as prices of foreign goods fall relative to domestically produced goods (Rees and Tyers, 2002) . Empirical evidence shows that import growth tends to outpace export growth in the first two years oraccession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO, but the long-tenn effect on the trade balance is uncertain (Li and LL 2000) . Contrary to this theoretical and empirical prediction. the renminbi has been under pressure to revalue since China's WTO accession, in part owing to increased FDI inflows. The exchange rate issue will not be further discussed in this paper.
terms of its impact on other developing countries, including on the least developed countries (LDCs),5
The paper is laid out as follows. The next section provides a brief account of China's opening up in the past two and a half decades, followed by an overview of China's commitments to the WTO in Section Ill. The etTects of China's WTO accession on other developing countries are examined in Section IV, and the long-term implications of China's growth and opening up are analyzed in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. CHINA'S INCREASII\G OPEN'USS
As part of its overall reform strategy, China's trade reforms have been a gradual process. The first step ofthe reforms was to replace trade planning with border measures in the form of quotas, tariffs, and licensing. For a number of years, trade plans co-existed with exchange controls and border measures, but they eventually gave way to border measures in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Lardy, 1991) . As can be seen from Table 1 , initial tarifflevels were high, but even these high rates probably understate the restrictiveness ofthe trade regime because of the extensive nontariffbarriers in place. Over time, however, these tariffs were brought down steadily. and nontmiff barriers were greatly reduced. While tariffs remained high, duty exemptions/drawbacks were increasingly used to encourage export production. Today, over half of China's imports comes into the country duty-free, and actual duty collection is about 3 percent of the import value.
Against the background of these reforms, there has been tremendous export expansion. China's merchandise exports increased from about $10 billion per annum in the late 1970s to $326 billion in 2002, or about 5 percent of total world exports-making it the sixth largest trading nation in the world. Primary commodity exports deelined steadily while the exports of labor-intensive manut~lctureSl such as textiles, clothing, toys, and electronics. have become dominant. Imports have also grown rapidly, with increasing demand for capital goods, raw material and intermediate goods. By the late 1990s, trade turnover accounted for more than 40 percent of China's GOP, making it a relatively open large economy (Figure 1 A less noticeable, but probably equally important component ofthe reforms was the decentralization of trade activities and the increased economic incentives provided to enterprises engaged in trade. The number of enterprises allowed to conduct foreign trade has increased from a dozen state-owned enterprises in the late 1970s to today's tens ofthousands, many of which are non-state-owned. ExpOli production has expanded tram designated stateowned enterprises to virtually any that can supply goods in demand or subcontract Irom those which can directly trade. , 1981-2002 (in percent) To offset the disincentives to export arising from the overvalued official exchange rate, which was partly attributed to the extensive import barriers, a dual exchange rate system and foreign exchange retention by exporting enterprises were introduced in the early 1980s. An increasing proportion of trade transactions was conducted at the less distorted internal settlement rate and subsequently at the secondary market rate. Over time, exchange controls were relaxed and exchange rate distortions were reduced. Tn 1994, the dual exchange rates were wrified at the prevailing secondary market rate, and in 1996, exchange controls on current account transactions were abolished.
China has also attracted large volumes of FDI since 1979, when it introduced its first law governingjoinl ventures. Like its trade regime, China's investment regime was initially rigid and ti"aught with bureaucracy and lack oftransparency. Notwithstanding continued problems, the regime has improved sleadily, often prompted by the successes of special investment policies first experimented with in special economic zones on the southeast coast ofthe country (Tseng and Zebregs, 2003 ).
China's FDI is still moderate in per capita terms, but its FDI-investment ralio is relatively high among developing countries (Figure 1 ). Total FDI inflows reached $53 billion in 2002, overtaking the United States as the world's largest FDI recipient that year 7 Large FDI inflows have fueled exp0l1 grow1h. Many FDI firms take advantage of China's competitive wages and are engaged in processing trade. With incentives offered through duty exemptions and drawbacks for cxport production, processing trade has surgcd, accotIDting for morc than half of the country's total exports.
III. CHINA'S COMMITMENTS TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) S
China made wide-ranging commitmcnts to liberalizing its markets in exchangc for thc various rights it now enjoys under WTO rules and for the phased removal of quantitative restrictions facing its exports in othcr WTO mcmbers 9 Oncc thc commitmcnts arc
implemented. the Chinese market should become significantly more open than it is now, not only in terms of lower bordcr barriers, but also in terms of grcatcr transparency of the tradc . 10
regIme.
In agriculture, China has committed to binding all tariffs. The average bound tariff will be reduced to 17.4 percent by 2005 from 31.5 percent before accession. For sensitive commodities, mostly cereals, a revamped tariff rate quota (TRQs) system has been put in place to regulate imports, While the above-quota tariff rates for TRQs are up to 65 percent (reduced from 80 percent), the in-quota rates are minimal (1-3 percent). Quota volumes generally increase rapidly, leaving considerable room for import expansion over time. China also agreed to eliminate export subsidies upon accession and limit its aggregate measure of support (AMS) to 8.5 percent for every product, instead of an average for all products." This would constrain China from providing disproportional support to any particular product. Based on these commitments, Johnson (2000) claims that China's agricultural market will be more open than either the United States or the EU.
Quantitative restrictions on imports of industrial products were to be eliminated upon accession or phased out over a specified period oftime. Industrial (bound) tarilts would be reduced to 9.4 percent by 2005. Like in agriculture, all tariffs are bound. China has also agreed to sign up to the WTO Information Technology Agreement (IT A), which will by 2005 result in the elimination of tariffs on information technology products. 12
The most far-reaching market opening is likely to take place in the services sector. China's services sector has been largely closed to competition, both from domestic and foreign services providers. Before WTO accession, foreign services providers faced extensive restrictions in licensing, equity participation, geographic location, business scope and operations. All these would be relaxed after accession or eventually removed after a transition period.
A widc rangc of scrviccs industries would be open to foreign competition. Thcsc includc telecommunications, financial services, distribution, travel and tourism, professional services and audiovisuals. In all these industries, restrictions on cntry and forcign owncrship werc to be relaxed upon accession and would be fluiher reduced over a specified period of time after accession. Restrictions on geographic location, business scope and operations would bc eventually abolished. Based on an assessment of the coverage and depth ofthese commitments, Mattoo (2002) China has also reluctantly accepted some discriminatory provisions in its accession protocol which can be used to limit the access of its exports to overseas markets. These provisions generally violate the nondiscrimination principle of the WTO and are likely to be a major source of trade dispute between China and its trading patiners. 13 The first ofthese provisions is the transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism. Unlike the general WTO safeguard rules, this mechanism targets Chinese products only. It can be invoked if there is "market disruption or the threat of market disruption caused by Chinese imports, instead of the more stringent injury test of"serious injury or the threat of serious injury" under the WTO Agrccmcnt on Safeguards. The transitional safeguard measures can also be taken by a third country ifthere is diversion or a threat of diversion of Chinese exports to that cOlmtry as a result of a safcguard action by the first importing country. This safeguard mechanism will last for 12 years atter China's accession to the WTO.
China's textile and clothing exports will be subject to a special safeguard mechanism until thc cnd of 2008. even though import quotas in the United States, Canada, and thc EU will be phased out by the beginning of2005. Like the transitional safeguard mechanism, this special safeguard mechanism is discriminatory and bascd on the notion of markct disruption, as in the defunct Multifiber Arrangement (MfA). While it limits any safeguard action to a duration of one year and provides for 6-7.5 percent annual increase in the growih of Chinese imports, it can take effect immediately upon request by the importing country for consultation with China. Special safeguard measures can also be re-applied. Chinese exp011ers will be assessed on dumping and subsidy charges according to rules that apply to nonmarket economies. Essentially, importing countries may use the prices or costs of similar products in other countries, instead of Chinese prices, to determine whether Chinese firms are dumping their products or are being subsidized. This had been the practice used by a number of countries before China' s accession to the WTO, but it is now legitimized on a multilateral basis through China's accession protocol.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CHII\A'S WTO ACCESSIO'l FOR DEVELOPII\G COUNTRIES
The effects ofChina's WTO accession on other developing countries are likely to be felt in two areas. 14 In the goods and services market, there will be increased competition from Chinese exporters in the world market as well as increased export opportunities in China. [n the international capital market, competition for FDl is likely to intensifY as the Chinese market becomes more open to foreign investment. At the theoretical level the impact of China's WTO accession on its trading partners is ambiguous. The impact will vary from country to country, depending on their trade structure and investment relations with China. Evaluating this impact is therefore largely an empirical exercise.
A. Opportunities and Competition in Trade
In the goods and services markets, the impact of China's WTO accession on other developing countries can be examined in terms o[ two o[[selting effects. The first and most obvious ellect is the increasing opporhmities for exports to China afler WTO accession. This pushes up export prices as well as increases export volumes. The second effect relates to the substitution of Chinese exports for its trading partners' products, both in their OW11 and third country markets. While increased competition in third country markets red uces partner countries' expOli revenue by lowering their expOli volumes and their prices, increased export supply from China lowers costs of impOlis for partner countries. The strength ofthe first effect dcpends on thc dcgree of complementarity bctween China's imports and its trading partners' exports. The second effect depends on the similarity of export commodities betwcen China and its dcveloping cOlmtry partners; the more similar they are, the stronger is the substitution eflect. A trading partner of China may lose exports in third country markets while gaining sales in the Chinesc market in addition to a tCfilS oftradc improvcment in its own market. Conceivably, a country's gain in the Chinese and its own markets can outweigh its loss in third cOlmtry markcts if its cxports arc sufficiently complementary to Chincse impOlis. While China's increased exports to industrial country markets tend to substitute for expOlis from other developing countries, they at the same time raise demand for imports from these countries. China has over time beco111e a regional manufacturing base for production of consumer goods, increasingly using imported intermediates as import barriers continue to fall. As a result, greater specialization of production has emerged among Asian economies, with China being the central link between its Asian trading partners and the industrial country markets (Yoshitomi, 2003) . China's position in this global manufacturing chain has been strengthened in recent years by large inflows ofFDI. This has increased the complementarity between China and its regional trading partuers and generated substantial efficiency gains, In agricnltnre, China's low in-qnota tariff rates and increasing quota volumes can give rise to rapid increases in import demand for many agricultural commodities. For bulk commodities other than rice, the Americas and Australasia may prove most competitive 15 Some Asian developing countries, such as Thailand and Vietnam, however. can signiticantly increase their rice exports to China. For most developing countries, potential for export expansion probably lies in labor-intensive and specialty products, most of which are subject to significant tariff reductions. China's demand for some tropical and sub-tropical products has grown rapidly in recent years (especially trom Southeast Asial, and is also likely to accelerate after WTO accession. Palm oil, coconut oil, rubber, bananas, and sugar are among a wide range of products that many developing countries can increase their exports to China, especially in the north.
Developing countries can expect a significant expansion of industrial exports to China afler WTO accession, although export gains will be uneven across countries. Despite significant reductions in bound tariffs as a result of WTO accession, effective reductions in tariffs are generally moderate, as applied tariffs are often significantly lower than their bound rates because exemptions and duty drawbacks were already extensive before accession. The most significant reductions in tariffs are likely to be in industties where industrial countries and the large, more advanced developing countries (e.g .• Brazil, India, and Russia) have a comparative advantages vis-it-vis China. These are presently highly protected automobiles and heavy chemical industries. Tn addition, developing countries specializing in electronic products arc likely to receive a boost to exports to China as it demands more intermediate inputs for its own expanding electronics industry, although their labor-intensive electronics will face increased competition from China (sec below).
There is considerable potential for developing countries to expand their exports of mineral products. Tariffs on these products were already low betore WTO accession, but their binding and the opening up of associated services sectors (such as distribution) should signiticantly improve the predictability of export opportunities. Resources-rich countries have already seen the increasing importance of Chinese demand in supporting global prices for minerals. 16 Higher world prices. however, increase the costs of imports for mineralsdeficient countries. This is paliicularly true in the energy sector, where China's increasing demand has resulted large increases in petroleum imports. 17 For most developing countries, China's WTO accession will probably not provide many opportunities for services exports. As noted earlier, China's most significant market opening is in sectors where industrial countries tend to have a comparative advantage (such as financial services, telecommunications, and professional services). Nevertheless, several Asian developing economies have become significant service providers in China and are likely to benetit considerably from services liberalization. India, in particular, has great potential to increase its exports of professional and IT-related services to China. There are also some niche markets for other developing countries. In tourism, travel and hospitality industries, for example, some Asian developing countries can become significant services providers by taking advantage of the thriving outbound tourism industry in China.
As far as China's increasing competition in the world export market is concerned, most of the negative impact is likely to be seen in textile and clothing and electronics industries; competition in agriculture and services industries will be largely unaHected as China's trading partners, including industrial countries, did not make many significant concessions on impOlis from China as part of accession negotiations. China's textile and clothing expOlis, especially the laUer, have proven very competitive (Francois and Spinanger, 2001) . For this reason. they have faced more stringent restrictions under the MFA than exports from most other developing countries. Continuous liberalization ofMF 1\ quotas, culminating in the tinal elimination of all remaining quotas at the begilUling of 2005, will lead to further expansion of Chinese exports, probably at the expense of some other developing countries. 18 Table 2 shows a set of simulation results using the GT AP model. 19 Caution is warranted in interpreting the results in Table 2 . These estimates are based the assumption that quotas facing China will be completely removed in 2005, without substitution by other forms of protection. It is quite possible that China's textile and clothing exports will face new restrictions under the special or product-specific safeguard mechanisms after MFA quotas arc phased out. For this reason, the estimates in Table 2 probably represent the upper bound of the impact. In addition, the simulation assumes no changes in productivity as trade is liberalized. It is almost certain that there will be productivity responses fi'om producers around the world and hence changes in relative competitiveness among exporting countries 20 In addition, recent international pressure on the renminbi exchange may result in a revaluation of the currency, although the timing is uncertain.
18 There have been sharp increases in Chinese exports of products for vvhich quotas were removed in 2002 under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATe). At the same time. many developing countries suHered export losses in these products. Also see IMF and World Rank (2002) for the adjustment issues facing developing countries arising from the liberalization of the textile and clothing sector. 19 The standard GTAP model and its cOITesponding databases were developed under the Global Trade Analysis Project at Purdue University (HerteL 1997). Database version 5 is documented in Dimaranan and McDougall (2002) . The model is run using GEM PACK. 20 There is also an issue of the benchmark against which the impact of China's accession to the WTO is measured. \Vhile lhe results in lhe lable show lhe erJecls o/'removing quolas lacing Chinese exporters only alter those facing other developing countries have already been removed, other available results may be calculated assuming simultaneous removal ofMF A quotas on a/I developing countries, including China. The latter approach will show a smaller increase in China's expOlts, and changes in other countries' exports may differ from those in Table 2 depending on the extent ofrestrietion they currently face. China's exports of electronic products are expected to expand rapidly in the next few years, posing increasing competition with other developing countries in the region. The likely boost to China's electronic exports comes fi'om its paJiicipation in the TTA (see Section TTl). Duty free imports of intermediate inputs will encourage processing trade in the electronic industry, perhaps much as happened in the textile and clothing and toys industries in early years (Adhikari and Yang, 2002) . The grO\v1h of processing trade is likely to accelerate as firms in Taiwan Province of China and the Republic of Korea continue to relocate the labor-intensive end of their electronics industry to China.
As China's processing industries expand, its demand for imports of electronic components will grow, especially at the higher end of capital intensity and technology sophistication. For these products, it will probably take a munber of years for China to catch up with some more advanced developing countries in the region. Meanwhile, there will be increasing intraindustry trade between China and other major producers in electronic products in Asia, notably, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines (Yoshitomi. 2003) .
B. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Diversion
It is widely expected that China's entry into the WTO will make it more attractive to FOI and as a result may further divert investment away from other developing countries. This concern has been expressed most strongly in ASEAN estate) in some ASEAN economics prior to the onset of the Asian crisis, FDI diversion to China would be beneficial. In normal circumstances, however, rDI diversion to China does impose costs on other developing countries. At any given level of world FDI supply, China's increased attraction to rDI raises the cost ofrDI tor other developing countries. This may slow their investment and hencc cconomic grow1h. In addition, FDI is widely believcd to generate externalities in host developing countries through its technological spill-over effects.
To what extent will accession-induced FDI diversion affect other developing countries 0 The answer depends on ho\v reforms associated with accession increase the returns on investment and reduce the risk premium demanded by foreign investors in China. In a recent paper evaluating the impact on neighboring countries of China's WTO accession using the G-Cubed model, McKibbin and Woo (2003) present three scenarios. The first scenario is what the authors regard as a "naive" case, in which China's WTO accession is simulated as reductions in its trade barriers. !n the second scenario, the "FD! diversion case," a 1 percentage point reduction in the risk premium for investment in China is introduced on top of trade barrier reductions. !n the last scenario, the simulation incorporates the so-called "technological spillover" etlects ofFDl in host countries. In particular, it is assumed that China's total factor productivity (TFP) growth would be I percentage point higher per annum for the period 2003-2112, whereas TFP grow1h in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand would be I percentage point lower per annum for the period. By 2112, TFP would be 10 percentage points above the baseline in China and 10 percentage points below the baseline in the four Southeast Asian countries.
Simulation results show that ifthe effect o[WTO accession does not go beyond raising expected returns on investment in China (the naive case), there is likely to be limited investment diversion (China's investment would rise 2.5 percent above the baseline in the long run) and hence small impact on GDP in other countries ( Figure 2 ). The impact increases significantly but remains small when accession results in a reduction in the risk premium in China 24 It is only when one assumes that FD! diversion will lead to a large TFP divergence between China and the [our Southeast Asian countries that China's WTO accession results in a significant adverse impact on these countries. This technological spillover scenario. though illust.rative, is unlikely to happen. Faced with increased competition [rom China, other developing countries are likely to respond with greater etlorts to increase their etticiency and should be able to compensate for at least part of the Trp loss resulting from lower rDI inflows. The FD! divcrsion implicd in thc simulation is largely driven by thc 20 pcrccnt gap that emerges from the assumed accession impact.
The simulations assume full international capital mobility for China. This tends to overstate thc potcntial capital inflows as a rcsult of WTO accession (indecd, as do thc simulation results presented in the following section). Despite its WTO commitments, China will probably continuc to maintain capital account controls for some timc to comc. Schcduled reductions in barriers against foreign investment in the services sector will likely lead to incrcascd FD! inflows in this scctor, but tariff rcductions will probably rcsult in consolidation ofPDI in the manut~lcturing sectorl rather than continued rapid growth of new investment. For example, the phasing out of extensive nontariffbarriers and reductions in high tariffs on automobile imports will discourage further investment in the sector. Even in the services sector, restrictions on FDI will be relaxed over time, and barriers to entry tend to be far more complex (such as asset portfolio requirements for foreign banks) than in the manufacturing sector (Lardy 2002 ). In addition, as the global economy recovers, China is likely to become less attractive to FDI. 
C. The Overall Impact on Other Countries
The above discussions suggest that evaluating the impact of China's WTO accession on other developing countries, as well as on China itself, is a complex exercise, as it involves careful analysis of changes in various markets and their interactions in response to China's WTO accession, For this reason, most quantitative assessments ofthe impact of China's WTO accession use general equilibrium models,'5 They tend to focus on the medium-term impact on the real economy, with limited attention to short-term macroeconomic dynamics, On the other hand. existing assessments of China's accession to the WTO incorporating such dynamics generally do not have sufJicienL details Lo trace the sources of welfare changes, 1/ Nevl'iy industrialized Asian economies (Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China). 2/ The Association of Southeast Asian Nations except for Singapore, which is included in the NIEs. 3/ Bostsvvana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. 27 Notwithstanding the differences in model structure, the simulation underlying the results presented in Table 4 is equivalent to the "FOI diversion" case in the McKibbin and Woo (2003) study except that it includes the effects of removing J\1f A quotas, which account for the bulk of the negative effects on other developing countries. As in the McKibbin and Woo simulation, the risk premium in China is assumed to decline by one percentage point as a result of WTO accession. Data on tariffreduetions are based on Deutsche Bank (200 I). It is assumed thal China's tarifr-rate quolm, will be filled. See Marlin (2002) lor lhe likelihood of such an outcome. Also see Ianchovichina and Martin (200 I) for how simulation results might be affected by explicitly incorporating processing trade in the model. 28 A similar set of results using the same model but incorporating productivit~y changes and excluding risk premium shocks is reported in Dorsey and others (2003) .
Great caution should be exercised in interpreting these results. First, like most other studies of this type, the results do not take into account the effects of China's liberalization in the services sector and changes in trading rules as a result of WTO accession. Second, these results capture only part of the impact of China's WTO accession even as far as merchandise trade is concerned. In particular, they do not incorporate any productivity changes arising from trade liberalization. Other effects missing from these results are the benefits trom improved transparency ofthe trade system and deeper integration into the global economy. Tn the case of agriculture, for instance, China's commitment to no export subsidies and moderate domestic subsidies will help reduce price volatility in world prices. At the macroeconomic level, China's greater openness can help mitigate macroeconomic cycles in the regional economies, as happened during the Asian Crisis in 1997-98 and the most recent global economic dO\mturn (Yang, 2002a) .
The concems over China's ascendancy resemble the anxiety caused by Japan's economic emergence after World War IT. At that time, many developed countries feared that Japan's low-wage competition would be a serious threat to their industries. The response to this perceived threat by many of Japan's trading partners was to deny Japan MFN status even after its accession to the GATT in 1955, by invoking the nonapplication clause ofthe GATT, the predecessor to the WTO. In the case of China, the response was to introduce in China's protocol of accession special and transitional product-specific safeguards and to continue the pre-accession antidumping and countervailing practices against Chinese exporters (see Section III).
The emergence of a country of China's size would entail considerable adjustment in the rest ofthe world in the short to medium term, but these costs need to be balanced against the likely long-term benefits from the integration of a large country into the global economy. From a historical perspective, China's WTO accession is simply part of its growth and opening-up process. The effects of WTO accession, such as those reported in Tables 3 and 4 , tend to be ditTerent trom the long-term effects of general gro,,1h and opening up in at least one important aspect: because of reductions in trade barriers against Chinese exports, such as those in the world textile and clothing market, China's WTO accession produces a one-off spur to its export expansion, increasing competition "ith other developing countries. Tn the long run, however, China's gro"1h and opening up should lead to more balanced expansion in both its exports and imports. Thus, to assess how China's emergence affects other developing countries, one needs to go beyond the effects of WTO accession, and examine these effects as part ofthe long-term implications of China's integration into the global economy.
A further comparison between China and Japan may help illustrate this point, From developing countries' point of view, there is now lillIe doubt that Japan's growth and opening up after World War ]] have benefited them, especially those in Asia. Japan serves as an important export market and a source of technology transfer through PDT and exports of capital goods. Japan's contribution to the economic gro,,1h of other industrial countries may look less obvious, but is probably equally significant. Tn the early years after World War IT, Japan's exports were concentrated in labor-intensive manufactures, much like China's today." [I' one believes that China's growing trade with today's industrial countries has benefited the latter (see footnote 14), then Japan's growth and trade with then industrial countries must have benefited them. Today's Japan is at the world's technological frontier, competing with other industrial countries in a wide range of manufactured goods and services (often in the form of intra-industry trade), while serving as a major export market for agricultural and other primary commodities-notwithstanding high trade barriers in agriculture. Given this, few would question that Japan's emergence has benetited industrial countries as well as developing countries.
There are nevertheless three major differences between today's China and the Japan then in its early stages of integration with the rest ofthe world. First. China's gro\\1h and opening up have coincided with the same process in a large number of other developing countries, whereas Japan was almost alone when it industrialized; there was limited competition between Japan and other developing countries (Japan was a developing country then). Second. while Japan hardly relied on foreign investment, China has absorbed large volumes ofFDI in competition with other developing countries. Third, there are many more goods and services traded today than fifty years ago. thanks to the falling transport cost and lower manmade trade barriers. In addition, products have become increasingly differentiated over time within manufactured goods and services. Technological innovation and increasingly discerning consumers have made this possible.
The tirst two differences make China more likely to compete with other developing cOlmtries, while the third diffcrencc makcs thcm more complemcntary. Thc qucstion then is: can China's gro\\1h and opening up today still benetit other developing countries'? One can think of China's growth and opening as having two offsetting effccts on a dcveloping country similar to those effects of WTO accession discussed in Section TV.A: the competitive and complementary effccts. In this case, howevcr, a third factor. the incomc effcct, is likely to be tar more important than in the case ofWTO accession. China's WTO accession is likely to incrcasc thc country's income, but thc magnitudc is small comparcd with thc incomc effcct of factor accumulation and technological progress over time.
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An empirical assessment of these two effects is reported by Yang and Vines (2000) 1975-1995 (Table 5) 32 These results show that China's growih acceleration during the period has benefited at least some developing countries and had little impact on others. This is because, on balance, China's accelerated growth leads to an improvement in the terms of trade for other developing countries, with the improvement in the terms of trade vis-it-vis China outweighing the deterioration vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Tt is noticeable li'om Table 5 that countries (such as the NTEs) that trade most extensively with China tend to benelit more from China's accelerated growth, and those that trade relatively less and compete more directly with China tend to benefit less or not at all. ASEAN belongs to this latter category of countries. This result is also born out by the trade results in Table 6 . Tn comparison with the NTEs, ASFAN loses more exports in third country markets to China relative to what it gains in the Chinese market. ASEAN exports to China were relatively small until the mid-1990s. For the other two broad groups of developing countries, while they export less to China compared to ASEAN, their exports are in less direct competition with China in third country markets. So on balance, these two groups of developing countries also benelit from China's accelerated growth, albeit only marginally.
This result has two important implications: (1) increasing trade with China is an effective way to benefit from China's growih, and (2) to benefit from China's growth, the mercantilist approach must be avoided. Competitive imports Irom China improve its trading partners' terms oftrade, just as China's increasing demand for imports. Based these two insights, it is likely that the tremendous expansion of China's trade since 1995 has benetited its trading partners. China's trade more than doubled during the period 1995-2002 (see the next section). A question remains whether or not this expansion of China's trade has benetited developing countries as well as industrial countries. Now given that many developing countries have similar factor endowments to China's, can they increase their exports to China as well as increase their imports from China? To answer this question, we turn to historical data.
Since the beginning of the economic reforms in 1978, China's imports have grown at a rate similar to that for exports, with exports exceeding imports in every year since 1994. Trade surplus averaged about 3 percent of GOP from 1994-2002. China ran a consistent trade deficit in its trade with industrial countries until 1996. and a trade surplus with developing countries in all but three years: 1993,2000--01 ( Figure 3) ; for these three years, China ran a small deficit. In 2002, bilateral trade was almost balanced. While it is too early to tell ifthe last three years represent a long-term change in China's trade with developing countries, China's impOlis from developing countries have been growing faster than its overall imports.
There seems to be a long-term shill in the sourcing of China's imports from industrial countries to developing countries (Figure 4 ). In 1978, nearly 70 percent of China's imports came from industrial countries. By 200 I, this share had declined to 49 percent, although this occurred primarily before 1992. Underlying this dramatic change is the increasing trade with Developed and Developing Countries, 1978-2002 (US$ billion) 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 160 o 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 This great volatility in trade intensity reflects the commodity composition of LOC cxports to China (as it does ofLOC exports in general), Most LOC exports to China consist of raw materials, especially mineral energy, Only Zambia, Bangladesh and Cambodia exported significant amounts of manufactured goods, Notwithstanding the weaknesses of fbis export structure in terms of its vulnerability to price volatility, LOCs do seem to have large potential in exports to China if they take the opportunity of China's opening up and meet China's growing demand for energy products and raw material, A difficult task to maintain the rapid trade with China is to build the necessary infrastructure and stay competitive in products of growing demand in China,
The above analysis suggests that in the long run, the effect of China's growth on other developing countries will become increasingly important relative to its competition effect (Fernald and others, 1999) , With increasing trade and investment flows, China's increasing openness should ensure that its grO\v1h translates into increases in demand for imports from other developing countries, and vice versa. 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 , , , 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
VI. CONCLlISIO:-'
China's accession to the WTO resnlts in greater competition in the world goods and capital markets, but it also provides increased market-access 0ppOliunities for exports from its developing country trading partners. Countries that have extensive trade links with China tend to benefit from China's accession to the WTO, while those that currently have limited trade with China may lose in the short and medium temls, especially if they export textiles and clothing and other labor-intensive manufactures to industrial countries in competition with China. This potential adverse effect is more likely to occur ifthese countries also compete with China for foreign direct investment. Simulation results suggest that the potential negative effects of China's WTO accession on these countries are generally small relative to their income.
The short-to-medium term impact of China's WTO accession on other developing countries differs from the long-tenn impact of China's growth and opening up. For historical reasons, China's exports of textiles and clothing have been subject to more stringent restrictions in industrial countries than those from other developing countries. The removal of this distortion as part of China's WTO accession package tends to lead to losses for some developing countries. More broadly, China's accession to the WTO should improve its competitiveness in labor-intensive manufactures as resources are released from presently more protected industries. In contrast, China's long-term growth and opening up have involved more even and smooth expansion of trade in a much wider range of commodities. Imports and exports have grown at a similar rate. After two decades of rapid growth, China's exports have diversified and upgraded considerably, and imports have become increasingly driven by processing trade and have shifted to goods in which many poor developing countries have a comparative advantage: agriculture, minerals, and other primary comnlodities.
Simulation results indicate that China's growih and opening up viewed as a whole do not seem to have adversely affected other developing countries. In fact, countries that have established strong trade and investment relations with China have benefited !i'mn the process. The mechanism whereby these countries have benefited is an important one: linking to a large, faster growing economy will improve the tenus oftrade as well as expand the volumes of trade. This could more than otfset the losses in third-country markets as a result of increasing competition from China's faster-growing economy.
This prediction seems to bc consistcnt with cmpirical evidcncc. During the past two dccades, during which China's labor-intensive manufactured exports have increased rapidly, many devcloping cOlmtries, including the least dcvclopcd countries, have been able to expand their exports to China. This suggests that a broad and long-term perspective is needed to evaluate the impact on other developing countries of China's accession to thc WTO. Indeed, China's WTO accession is part of the country's reform and opening-up process that has been going on for more than two decades. A more open and fastcr-growing Chinesc cconomy as a rcsult of its WTO accession should benetit more developing countries in the long run.
